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SEC Rule 14a-8: New Restrictions on
Corporate Democracy?
INTRODUCTION
R ULE 14a-8, 1 the shareholder proposal rule promulgated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission under Section 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 has become one of the
most interesting and controversial agency rules of the last dec-
ade.8 Briefly, Rule 14a-8 requires the management of a corpora-
tion to include in its proxy materials any proposal submitted to it
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1984). The predecessor to Rule 14a-8 was Rule X-14A-7,
which first required corporate management to include in its proxy materials any nonman-
agement proposal that was a "proper subject for action by the security holders." Rule
X-14A-7, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,656 (1942). Since 1947 it has been called Rule 14a-8, providing
shareholders of public companies the right to have their proposals presented to the com-
pany's body of shareholders at little or no expense to the proponent. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-8 (1984).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). Section 14(a) authorizes the SEC to prescribe those
rules or regulations "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors . . . . " 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
3. Rule 14a-8 has been the subject of a continuous debate since its inception in 1942.
Legal commentators have struggled to define an appropriate balance between the manage-
ment and shareholder interests protected by the rule. One group of writers has taken an
expansive, liberal view of the rule, arguing that the shareholder interest in maintaining an
effective voice in the corporate governing process should be paramount to other interests.
See generally Emerson & Latcham, The SEC Proxy Proposal Rule: The Corporate Gadfly, 19 U.
Cm. L. REv. 807 (1952); Schwartz & Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal
Rule, 65 Gao. L.J. 635 (1977); Propp, The SEC's Shareholder Proposal Rule: Corporate Account-
ability at a Crossroads, 11 Sac REG. L.J. 99 (1983); Curzan & Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate
Democracy: Control of Investment Managers' Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 H~Auv.
L. Rzv. 670 (1980); Comment, Shareholder Democracy: A Description and Critical Analysis of the
Proxy System, 60 N.C.L. REv. 145 (1981) [hereinafter Shareholder Democracy]. Other commen-
tators have held a more restrictive view, arguing that the shareholder proposal rule should
have reasonable limitations on its use so as to reduce the cost and overall burden of the
rule. See generally Manne, Shareholder Social Proposals Viewed By An Opponent, 24 STAN. L.
REv. 481 (1972); Black & Sparks, SEC Rule 14a-8: Some Changes in the Way the SEC Staff
Interprets the Rule, 11 U. ToL L. REv. 957 (1980); Note, Proxy Rule 14a-8: Omission of Share-
holder Proposals, 84 HARv. L. REv. 700 (1971). For a general discussion of other aspects of
the shareholder proposal rule, see Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83
HAiv. L. REv. 1489 (1970); Note, The SEC and "No-Action" Decisions Under Proxy Rule 14a-8:
The Case for Direct Judicial Review, 84 HARv. L. REV. 835 (1971); Comment, SEC Shareholder
Proposal Rule 14a-8: Impact of the 1972 Amendments, 61 Gao. L.J. 781 (1973) [hereinafter
SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-81.
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by a record or beneficial owner of voting stock in the company,
unless the proponent fails to satisfy the rule's eligibility and proce-
dural criteria4 or the content of the proposal falls within one of
4. Paragraph (a) of Rule 14a-8 delineates certain eligibility and procedural require-
ments which must be satisfied by a proponent in order to present a resolution to corporate
management for inclusion in the proxy materials. The provision states, in relevant part:
(1) Eligibility. [i] At the time he submits the proposal, the proponent shall be a
record or beneficial owner of at least 1% or $1,000 in market value of securities
entitled to be voted at the meeting and have held such securities for at least one
year, and he shall continue to own such securities through the date on which
the meeting is held. If the issuer requests documentary support for a propo-
nent's claim that he is a beneficial owner of at least $1,000 in market value of
such voting securities of the issuer or that he has been a beneficial owner of the
securities for one or more years, the proponent shall furnish appropriate docu-
mentation within 14 calendar days after receiving the request. In the event the
issuer includes the proponent's proposal in its proxy soliciting materials for the
meeting and the proponent fails to comply with the requirement that he contin-
uously hold such securities through the meeting date, the issuer shall not be
required to include any proposals submitted by the proponent in its proxy
materials for any meeting held in the following two calendar years.
(2) Notice and Attendance at the Meeting. At the time he submits a proposal, a
proponent shall provide the issuer in writing with his name, address, the num-
ber of the issuer's voting securities that he holds of record or beneficially, the
dates upon which he acquired such securities, and documentary support for a
claim of beneficial ownership. A proposal may be presented at the meeting ei-
ther by the proponent or his representative who is qualified under state law to
present the proposal on the proponent's behalf at the meeting. In the event
that the proponent or his representative fails, without good cause, to present
the proposal for action at the meeting, the issuer shall not be required to in-
clude any proposals submitted by the proponent in its proxy soliciting material
for any meeting held in the following two calendar years.
(3) Timeliness. The proponent shall submit his proposal sufficiently far in ad-
vance of the meeting so that it is received by the issuer within the following
time periods:
[i] Annual Meetings. A proposal to be presented at an annual meeting shall be
received at the issuer's principal executive offices not less than 120 days in ad-
vance of the date of the issuer's proxy statement released to security holders in
connection with the previous year's annual meeting of security holders, except
that if no annual meeting was held in the previous year or the date of the an-
nual meeting has been changed by more than 30 calendar days from the date
contemplated at the time of the previous year's proxy statement, a proposal
shall be received by the issuer a reasonable time before the solicitation is made.
(4) Number of Proposals. The proponent may submit no more than one proposal
and an accompanying supporting statement for inclusion in the issuer's proxy
materials for a meeting of security holders.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (1984).
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the substantive exclusions enumerated in the rule.5 Since 1970,
5. Paragraph (c) of the Rule sets forth thirteen substantive grounds upon which man-
agement may rely in omitting shareholder proposals from its proxy materials. The provi-
sion states, in pertinent part:
The issuer may omit a proposal and any statement in support thereof from its
proxy statement and form of proxy under any of the following circumstances:
(1) If the proposal is, under the laws of the issuer's domicile, not a proper
subject for action by security holders ...
(2) If the proposal, if implemented, would require the issuer to violate any
state law or federal law of the United States, or any law of any foreign jurisdic-
tion, to which the issuer is subject, except that this provision shall not apply
with respect to any foreign law compliance with which would be violative of any
state law or federal law of the United States.
(3) If the proposal or the supporting statement is contrary to any of the
Commission's proxy rules and regulations, including Rule 14a-9 [17 C.F.R.
240.14a-9], which prohibits false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting
materials;
(4) If the proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim or grievance
against the issuer or any other person, or if it is designed to result in a benefit
to the proponent or to further a personal interest, which benefit or interest is
not shared with the other security holders at large;
(5) If the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5% of
the issuer's gross assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for less than
5% of its net earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not
otherwise significantly related to the issuer's business;
(6) If the proposal deals with a matter that is beyond the issuer's power to
effectuate;
(7) If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the ordi-
nary business operations of the issuer;
(8) If the proposal relates to an election to office;
(9) If the proposal is counter to a proposal to be submitted by the issuer at
the meeting;
(10) If the proposal has been rendered moot;
(11) If the proposal is substantially duplicative of a proposal previously sub-
mitted to the issuer by another proponent, which proposal will be included in
the issuer's proxy materials for the meeting;
(12) If the proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as a
prior proposal submitted to security holders in the issuer's proxy statement and
form of proxy relating to any annual or special meeting of security holders held
within the preceding 5 calendar years, it may be omitted from the issuer's
proxy materials relating to any meeting of security holders held within 3 calen-
dar years after the latest such previous submission: Provided That
(i) If the proposal was submitted at only one meeting during such period, it
received less than five percent of the total number of votes cast in regard
thereto; or
(ii) If the proposal was submitted at only two meetings during such preceding
period, it received at the time of its second submission less than eight percent
of the total number of votes cast in regard thereto; or
(iii) If the proposal was submitted at three or more meetings during such pre-
ceding period, it received at the time of its latest submission less than 10 per-
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many shareholders have used Rule 14a-8 to raise social responsi-
bility issues at annual meetings, often drawing the attention of the
media and the scorn of the corporate community." Churches, pub-
lic interest groups, unions, and several institutional investors have
exercised their rights as shareholders to place more than 100 so-
cial and political resolutions a year on corporate proxy state-
ments.7 Their proposals have raised popular social responsibility
issues such as the use of nuclear power, the disposal of toxic waste,
and the morality of commercial investment in South Africa, as
well as a host of other issues such as trade with communist coun-
cent of the total number of votes cast in regard thereto; or
(13) If the proposal relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1984).
6. The genesis of the "social responsibility" proposal essentially began with the first
Campaign to Make General Motors Responsible, in 1970. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy
Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MicH. L. REv. 419, 421-23 (1971). Since then, the
variety of social issues proposed by stockholders has been diverse. In 1984, for example,
the following issues were raised: corporate activities in South Africa, Rhodesia, Chile and
the European communist countries; illegal corporate payments abroad; corporate political
contributions and operations; equal employment opportunity; the world debt crisis; the dis-
posal of toxic waste; corporate environmental policy; the use of nuclear power; computer
contracts with the Soviet Union; the exposure of workers to toxic substances; media images
of women and minorities; and the morality of genetic engineering-to name just a few.
Corp. Examiner, Spr. 1984 (Interfaith Center on Corp. Responsibility newsletter).
According to the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. (hereinafter ASCS), a
professional association which tracks shareholder proposals submitted to U.S. corporations
for inclusion in corporate proxy statements, 870 shareholder proposals were submitted to
345 ASCS member and non-member corporations during the period of July 1, 1982 to
June 30, 1983. Issuers contested 336 of these proposals by formally requesting the SEC to
agree not to challenge the exclusion of these proposals, i.e., to issue an SEC no-action
letter. The SEC granted such requests for 215, or 63% of the contested proposals. Am.
Soc'y of Corp. Secretaries, Report on Shareholder Proposals 5 (1983).
Of the 870 proposals submitted for vote, ASCS compiled the following topical break-
down: 117 proposals on security issuance and stockholder's rights; 145 on directors and
directors' meetings; 19 on auditors and accounting procedures; 8 on energy (non-nuclear)
issues; 97 on compensation and benefit plans; 48 on nuclear power; 97 on foreign involve-
ment; 79 on management and employees; 39 on corporate contributions; 94 on annual
meetings and proxy material; 10 on environmental policy; 78 on public responsibility is-
sues; 28 on political issues; and 11 miscellaneous proposals. Id. at 6.
7. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center (hereinafter IRRC), an
organization which tracks social responsibility proposals, the number of these proposals has
remained relatively constant over the past several years. The IRRC reported: 133 propos-
als in 1976; 113 proposals in 1977; 95 proposals in 1978; 98 proposals in 1979; 108 pro-
posals in 1980; 124 proposals in 1981; 109 proposals in 1982; and 111 proposals in 1983.
C. Richardson, How Institutions Voted on Shareholder Resolutions in the 1983 Proxy Sea-
son 3 (Sept. 1983) (IRRC report) [hereinafter cited as IRRC Report].
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tries, human rights, equality, and consumer protection.'
Until recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission
viewed the proliferation of social and political shareholder resolu-
tions without much concern or anxiety. The Commission had,
prior to the recent rulemaking initiative, liberally interpreted the
rule to explicitly confirm shareholders' rights to raise corporate
issues through the medium of proxy materials.9 The recent ten-
dency to use the rule for the promotion of social and political is-
sues meshed well with this liberal administrative posture and the
Commission's desire to enhance corporate accountability and dis-
closure generally.10 The SEC thus viewed the proposal mechanism
as simply one instrument to adjust and tune a corporate structure
which had become deficient in responding to social issues.1
8. Although South Africa and anti-nuclear issues continue to outnumber all other
types of proposal issues, there has been a significant increase in the number of conserva-
tive-sponsored resolutions in recent years. In 1981, for example, more than 25 companies
received anti-communist resolutions. Most of them requested the company to adopt a "no
trade" policy with European communist countries. One proposal, made to General Motors,
called for a policy of ascertaining the number of avowed communists on the faculty of
colleges before making donations to those schools. Other conservative proposals have in-
cluded: I.B.M. Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. Sa.M L. Rap. (CCH) 82,009 (Feb. 2,
1979) (proposal seeking to amend the articles of incorporation to require the company to
avoid business dealings with communist countries); Gager, Henry & Narkis, [1979 Transfer
Binder] FEn. Sc. L. RaP. (CCH) 82,045 (Apr. 20, 1979) (recommendation that the com-
pany seriously consider a sale or merger of the company for at least $36/share) and Mobil
Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. Sa.. L. RaP. (CCH) 1 76,832 (Feb. 26, 1981) (proposal
requesting board to inform shareholders of all aspects of company's business in communist
countries). See also supra note 6.
9. See infra notes 25-80 and accompanying text.
10. The proxy rules were originally based on the philosophy of "disclosure," the hall-
mark of the federal securities laws. See infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text. However,
the Commission has acknowledged that Rule 14a-8 was also designed to enhance corporate
accountability. The SEC once noted:
Recent disclosures concerning a wide variety of questionable and illegal corpo-
rate practices, accomplished in certain instances with the knowledge and partici-
pation of top corporate management, have served to focus public attention on
corporate accountability. A number of proposals designed to achieve a new
"corporate governance," have been suggested.. . . The SEC, through its juris-
diction over proxy solicitations . . . recognizes that under existing regulations
shareholders often may not be provided adequate opportunities to participate
meaningfully in corporate governance or the corporate electoral process.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-13482, 42 Fed. Reg. 23,901 (1977).
11. This position is illustrated by statements made by the SEC in a 1980 Staff Report.
In this Report, the SEC recognized that the shareholder proposal rule may serve many
functions: shareholder resolutions sensitize management to issues which it might otherwise
ignore; the rule offers management an inexpensive device for listening to stockholder ex-
pression; and the resolution process provides a "means of questioning a management which
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The SEC commitment to Rule 14a-8 rarely faltered, despite
the fact that the shareholder proposal rule underwent a number
of revisions and interpretations since its inception in 1942. Each
regulatory response revealed the Commission's ability to maintain
a fair balance between two competing interests: the management
interest in an inexpensive, non-confrontational solicitation pro-
cess, and the shareholder interest in maintaining an effective voice
in the corporate governing process.12 The administrative history
of Rule 14a-8 is a testimonial to the SEC's effectiveness in preserv-
ing this delicate balance while simultaneously encouraging the lib-
eral use of the rule. 8
The placid tradition of the shareholder proposal rule was up-
set in 1970, when the public policy resolution became widely rec-
ognized as an effective instrument to facilitate shareholder partici-
pation in the control of the corporate enterprise. 4 As the number
of social and political resolutions increased to new levels, many
commentators became sharply critical of the Commission's effec-
tiveness in maintaining the balance between management and
shareholder interests."5 The corporate community criticized the
SEC for providing open access to the proxy rules for shareholders
that were more interested in social issues than the business of the
corporation. 6 The argument was that the mere submission of
otherwise might tend to become self-seeking, ingrown and autocratic." Div. OF CORP. FIN.,
SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE AccoUNTABILrrY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.
136-37 (Comm. Print 1980)[hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT]. See also supra note 10.
12. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 3, at 638; Comment, Shareholder Deinocracy, supra
note 3, at 159; Black & Sparks, The SEC as Referee-Shareholder Proposals and Rule 14a-8, 2
J. CORP. L. 1 (1976).
13. See infra notes 25-80 and accompanying text.
14. See supra note 6.
15. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 3, at 638.
16. This argument has been made repeatedly by a number of corporations in their
comments on SEC revisions of Rule 14a-8. In 1976, Union Carbide, commenting on the
amendments to the Rule, made the following statement:
[W]e would like to express at the outset our disappointment that the Com-
mission has not dealt in the proposed amendments with a problem that is of
growing concern to most stockholders. This is the increasingly common prac-
tice of individuals or groups having special interests-not related to the general
welfare of either the corporation or the majority of its stockholders in their
status as stockholders-obtaining an unfair share of the attention of manage-
ment and shareholders. They even may do this by purchasing a few shares of
stock several months before a corporation's annual meeting in order to qualify
for submission of a proposal for consideration at the meeting. They may also do
so by obtaining a proxy from an institutional holder. Their primary purpose is
230 [Vol. 3 3
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these proposals, which were supported by only a small minority of
shareholders, required considerable expenditures by the corpora-
tion to include them in proxy materials, an expense borne primar-
ily by the majority.17
In response to mounting pressure from the business commu-
nity and in order to ease the Commission's own burden of inter-
preting the new public policy shareholder proposals,"8 the SEC re-
cently revised Rule 14a-8 to limit investor access to the proxy
machinery. 9 In addition to placing stricter eligibility require-
ments on shareholders wishing to submit proxy proposals, the
amendments deal with procedural changes, alter staff positions on
exclusions, and extend some filing deadlines.2 0 Nearly all of the
revisions give issuers greater interpretative latitude to exclude
shareholder proposals.
The new changes have drawn a split reaction from the public.
The business community has generally applauded the revisions be-
cause they restrict shareholder access to the proposal process.
2 1
to obtain a forum for airing their views on a frequently narrow subject. Most
such proposals are supported by the votes of only a tiny percentage of stock-
holders at the meeting, which not only dismays disinterested stockholders but
more importantly, restricts the time available to deal with topics that are of
major concern to the majority. The mere submission of the proposal also leads
to considerable expenditures by the corporation to include it in its proxy mate-
rial, an expense borne primarily by the majority.
Letter from John F. Shanklin, Vice-President and Secretary, Union Carbide Corp., to
George F. Fitzsimmons, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 7, 1976) (SEC File No. S7-643), quoted in
Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 3, at 638 n.16. For a discussion of past corporate efforts to
pressure the SEC for a revision of the rule, see Propp, supra note 3, at 108.
17. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 3, at 638 n.16.
18. Besides establishing the ground rules for the shareholder proposal process, the
SEC also plays an active role in administering the rule. The SEC's Division of Corporate
Finance must resolve numerous disputes between proponents and companies over whether
a resolution has complied with the procedural requirements and has avoided one of the
thirteen exclusions. The staff's decision is communicated to both parties in the form of a
no-action letter. Court decisions in Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d
659 (D.C. Cir. 1970) and in Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974) have com-
pelled the Commission not to review a staff no-action letter so as to avoid creating review-
able agency action.
19. In choosing to recast existing regulations, the Commission rejected two more
sweeping proposals which would have in one case allowed companies and their sharehold-
ers to adopt their own procedures on the submission of proxy proposals and, in the other,
required the inclusion of any proposal proper under state law except for election of direc-
tors. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-20091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218 (1983).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., O'Connell, Legitimate Voices Will Still Be Heard, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1983,
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The new rule, it is argued, will reduce corporate expenditures as-
sociated with proxy materials and ease management frustration
with being repeatedly second-guessed by their shareholders.22 In
direct contrast, socially-conscious investors and activist organiza-
tions have assailed the new changes as an effort by the SEC, under
the direction of the business community, to employ arbitrary eligi-
bility qualifications to limit shareholder participation in corporate
governance.28 These stockholders, lacking any other means to in-
fluence corporate decisions, have regarded Rule 14a-8 as a bastion
of corporate democracy.
24
To some outside observers, Rule 14a-8 may appear to be a
relatively modest provision in the federal securities laws. But to
management and shareholders, the rule goes to the heart of cor-
porate law- affecting the fundamental relationship of sharehold-
ers and management to each other and to the corporation.
Viewed from this perspective, the Commission's new amendments
have raised serious questions about the extent to which sharehold-
ers should participate in corporate governance.
This Comment will examine the impact of the new rule on
the ability of shareholders to use the proxy as a forum for social
and political dialogue. Section I delineates the historic legitimacy
of Rule 14a-8, demonstrating that the Congress, the courts, and
the SEC have all viewed the rule as an indispensable utilitarian
mechanism for shareholder influence on corporate decisionmak-
ing. Section II examines the circumstances which initiated reform
of the proposal rule, the objectives of the subsequent rulemaking
proceeding, and the reasons for the final selection of the rule revi-
sions. Section III then demonstrates that the Commission's final
adoption of the new rule was based on: (1) the fallacy that there
was an "abuse" of the proposal process in recent years; and (2) the
mistaken belief that the rule revisions could materially reduce the
costs associated with the proposal process. Some of the theoretical
problems raised by the new Rule 14a-8 are also discussed. An im-
§ 3, at 2, col. 3.
22. Id.
23. Lydenberg, A Setback for Corporate Democracy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1983, § 3, at 2,
col. 3.
24. The stockholder proposal process has been recognized as providing a forum for
dissent that many believe is essential to the successful functioning of corporations in a dem-
ocratic society. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 3, at 635.
232 [Vol. 33
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portant theme runs through this entire discussion: the Commis-
sion's new attitude on the shareholder proposal process is a radi-
cal departure from past SEC policy and, as such, raises serious and
alarming questions regarding the future vitality of corporate
democracy.
I. THE HISTORIC LEGITIMACY OF THE
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL RULE
A. The Corporate Democracy Mandate
The SEC promulgated the shareholder proposal rule in 1942
pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.25 This section gives the SEC broad authority to regulate the
solicitation of proxies "as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors."26 Although Congress
primarily designed the proxy legislation to require disclosure of
relevant information and to prohibit the use of fraudulent market
activities, the legislative history of section 14(a) reveals that mem-
bers of Congress were also concerned with the preservation of
corporate democracy as a concept. 7
The widening divergence between the ownership of corpora-
tions and the management of these entities had raised concern in
Congress about the potential abuse of corporate power.2 8 Manage-
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
27. Professor Loss noted that the SEC's "power under § 14(a) is not necessarily lim-
ited to ensuring full disclosure ... [a]nd some of the rules do not fit into the disclosure
mold .... 2 L. Loss, SEcuRrriEs REGULAMON 868 (2d ed. 1961). As one Congressman
explained:
Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity
security bought on a public exchange. Managements of properties owned by the
investing public should not be permitted to perpetuate themselves by the mis-
use of corporate proxies.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 13-14 (1934). See Medical Comm. for Human
Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where the court stated "it is obvious to the
point of banality to restate the proposition that Congress intended by its enactment of
section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to give true vitality to the concept of
corporate democracy." See also Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC
v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948). For
a discussion of the varied purposes of the proxy legislation, see Loomis & Rubman, Corpo-
rate Governance in Historical Perspective, 8 HorsamA L. REv. 141, 170-71 (1979).
28. The House of Representatives noted:
Even those who in former days managed great corporations were by reason of
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ment would, it was feared, seek to perpetuate itself by the misuse
of corporate proxies when divorced from the responsibilities of
ownership. Prior to 1934, many corporate officers solicited stock-
holder's proxies without telling the stockholders what matters
would be considered at the annual meeting.2 Management later
used these proxies at the meeting for a variety of questionable
purposes.30 To eliminate the problems caused by the ownership-
management divergence, Congress gave the SEC broad regulatory
power to prevent "the recurrence of abuses which [had] frus-
trated the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders. "31
The Commission was also directed to promote "fair corporate suf-
frage" as a fundamental principle of corporate governance. 2
The Securities and Exchange Commission, acting pursuant to
the congressional mandate for corporate democracy, promptly
adopted rules which required management to provide sharehold-
ers with adequate notice of all matters it intended to bring before
the shareholders' meeting.3 These rules were later expanded to
prevent management from stating that there would be no other
matters before the meeting if, in fact, management had already
been informed by a shareholder of his intention to introduce a
resolution from the floor.3 ' Although these provisions gave a
shareholder a legal right to introduce a proposal at the annual
meeting, the proponent often lacked support for a resolution
since it was being introduced for the first time and because only a
small percentage of stockholders ever attended these meetings.3 5
their personal contacts with their shareholders constantly aware of their respon-
sibilities. But as management became divorced from ownership and came under
the control of banking groups, men forgot that they were dealing with the sav-
ings of men and the making of profits became an impersonal thing. When men
do not know the victims of their aggression they are not always conscious of
their wrongs ....
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934).
29. Id. One congressman noted: "Too often proxies are solicited without explanation
to the shareholder of the real nature of the matters for which authority to cast his vote is
sought." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
30. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
31. Id. at 14.
32. Id. at 13.
33. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 3, at 636 & n.7 (citing S.E.C. Rules LA-1 to LA-7,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-378 (Sept. 24, 1935)).
34. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 3, at 636 & n.8 (citing S.E.C. Rule X-14A-2, Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 34-1823 (Aug. 11, 1938)).
35. See Freeman, An Estimate of the Practical Consequences of the Stockholders' Proposal
234 [Vol. 33
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It is evident that shareholder resolutions could have secured
greater support if the proposals had been included in the com-
pany proxy materials. Unfortunately, the agency rules did not rec-
ognize this form of shareholder communication.
In 1938, the Commission addressed the issue of whether the
full disclosure policy of the proxy rules could require the manage-
ment of a corporation to include shareholder resolutions in the
proxy materials. The staff concluded that the underlying premise
of the securities laws required the inclusion of these proposals. 8
In so doing, the SEC implicitly stated that the proxy rules were
based not only on the disclosure and fraud rationales, but also on
theories of corporate governance and shareholder democracy.3
In fact, the Commission itself once noted that its proxy rules were
"probably the most useful of all the disclosure devices established
by our various acts and represent an effective contribution to cor-
porate democracy." '3 These revelations on the relationship be-
tween Rule 14a-8 and corporate governance are essential to an
understanding of the current debate. 9
B. The Early Development of Rule 14a-8
The SEC's interpretation of the proxy rule as including no-
tions of corporate democracy was formally codified in 1942 when
Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 549, 553 (1957).
36. According to one commentator:
[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission interpreted Regulation X-14 as
meaning (a) that if a stockholder has notified the management prior to the time
the management has sent out its proxy material that the stockholder proposes
to offer a resolution at the annual meeting on some subject which falls generally
within the province in which a stockholder may properly propose resolutions
.. .and (b) that if the management makes no mention of such proposal in its
proxy statement. . . the proxy statement.. . is false or misleading....
Dean, Non-Compliance with Proxy Regulations-Effect on Ability of a Corporation to Hold Valid
Meeting, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 483, 499-500 (1939). The SEC also relied on the language of
section 14, noting that it was empowered to regulate not just the solicitation of proxies but
also the "conditions" under which proxies were solicited. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1934).
37. The dual philosophy which underlies the proxy rules has been recognized by sev-
eral legal commentators. See Propp, supra note 3, at 102; Manne, supra note 3, at 484;
Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 3, at 638; Loomis & Rubman, supra note 27, at 170-71.
38. REPORT OF THE SEC, PROPOSAL TO SAFEGUARD INVESToRs IN UNREGISTERED SECU-
nEs, H.R. Doc. No. 672, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946).
39. Manne, supra note 3, at 484.
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the Commission adopted Rule X-14A-7,'40 the predecessor to the
modern shareholder proposal rule. The regulation required man-
agement to include within its proxy statement, and to provide all
shareholders with an opportunity to vote on, any proposed share-
holder resolution that constituted "a proper subject for action by
the security holders.""1 The "proper subject" standard was
designed to invoke the substantive state criteria for delineating
the authority of the board and shareholders.42
Initially, the interpretation of the "proper subject" test of
Rule X-14A-7 was problematic. Most state corporation statutes
had already conferred significant powers on the board of directors
to manage the general affairs of the business at the expense of
shareholder power.48 Although these statutes required the initia-
tive for major corporate activities to come from the board rather
than the stockholders, the statutes did not necessarily preclude in-
dependent stockholder action in all areas of corporate activity.44
The problem, however, was that very few cases had enumerated
those areas that fell within the realm of stockholder control or
initiative.4 The paucity of state law, both statutory and decisional,
compelled the SEC to develop its own administrative guidelines
regarding when a proposal was a "proper subject for action by
security holders." These guidelines often made staff interpretative
decisions (i.e. whether or not to exclude a given proposal) depen-
dent on the form of the proposal rather than its substantive
content.
A clear illustration of this formalistic approach was the staff's
development of a "by-laws" exception to the proper subject test.
The SEC recognized that nearly all state corporation statutes
grant shareholders the right to amend corporate by-laws.4 6 A




43. The corporation law of Delaware, for example, states: "The business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certifi-
cate of incorporation. ... ." Dm. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983).
44. See, e.g., SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 847 (1948).
45. See Black & Sparks, supra note 3, at 965-66.
46. Traditionally, the power to make and amend by-laws has been vested in the share-
holders. As the Supreme Court has stated: "[The plower to prescribe rules for the govern-
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shareholder proposal which was cast in the "form" of a by-law
amendment thus became eligible for inclusion in the proxy mate-
rial even though the proposal was substantively not a "proper sub-
ject" under state law.4 7 The same administrative approach was
used to justify the inclusion of "precatory proposals" as well. The
SEC recognized the principle that shareholders are entitled to
give nonbinding advice to the board on matters that are within
the authority of the board.48 A proposal that was improper under
applicable state law when framed as a mandate or directive, thus
became eligible for inclusion when framed as a recommendation
or request.4' Both the "by-laws" and "precatory proposal" excep-
tions demonstrate that the Commission's interpretative posture
was frequently contingent upon the form of the proposal and not
its content. It was precisely this type of administrative creativity,
however, which enabled the SEC to encourage the liberal vitality
of the proxy rules while remaining deferential to the force of state
ment of business corporations reasonably is deemed an incident of ownership and the vot-
ing power of the shares." Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 588 (1933).
Some modem statutes have recognized, however, that the shareholder power to make
or amend by-laws can become inconvenient in large corporations with many shareholders.
The legal necessity of waiting until the annual shareholders' meeting or calling a special
meeting before making any change in the by-laws is impractical when time is of the es-
sence. Accordingly, many state statutes now provide that the directors may make or amend
by-laws-either exclusively or contingent upon shareholder rights. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAw § 601 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
47. See Black & Sparks, supra note 3, at 966. See also Kapp & Bancroft, No-Action Letter
Highlights, 3 Seo. REG. L.J. 71, 73-80 (1975).
48. The SEC recognized the special nature of precatory proposals shortly after the
decision in Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954). Auer stands for the
proposition that shareholders are entitled to give nonbinding advice to the board on mat-
ters that are within the authority of the board. See id. Subsequently, a note to subparagraph
(c)(1) of Rule 14a-8 stated: "A proposal that may be improper under applicable state law
when framed as a mandate or directive may be proper when framed as a recommendation
or a request." S.E.C. Rule 14a-8(c)(1), 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994 (1976).
In a no-action letter to Marvin E. Schmalzried, Senior Vice-President and Secretary,
American Home Products Corp., Peter J. Romeo, Special Counsel, S.E.C., stated:
[T]he adoption by the Commission in 1954 of paragraph (cX5) of Rule
14a-8, which allows the omission of recommendations or requests that "relate
to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer", implicitly rec-
ognizes that proposals which would be considered improper under paragraph
(c)(1) as directives are proper under that paragraph if phrased in precatory
form, and may be excluded from management's proxy materials only if some
other provision of Rule 14a-8 so requires.
Am. Home Prod., Inc. (March 4, 1976), quoted in, Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 3, at 661
n.134.
49. See supra note 48.
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law.
The courts explicitly confirmed the validity of the SEC's lib-
eral administrative approach. In an early case, SEC v. Transamerica
Corp.,50 a shareholder submitted a resolution asking for the repeal
of a corporate by-law which gave the Transamerica directors vir-
tually unchecked discretion to exclude proposed by-law amend-
ments from shareholder meetings. The company refused to in-
clude the proposal in the proxy materials on the ground that
management had a complete veto power over any shareholder at-
tempt to amend the by-laws. The court recognized that the by-law
upon which the directors sought to rely was in direct conflict with
Rule X-14A-7. As such, it represented a significant challenge to
the future of the proposal rule: could the operation of Rule X-
14A-7 be obviated by a corporate by-law, arguably valid under
state law, which gave the directors the exclusive right to decide
which proposals warranted inclusion in the proxy?
Although the Third Circuit was able to invalidate the by-law
under the provisions of applicable state law,5 1 the court did indi-
cate that even if the by-law had been valid under state law it
would, nevertheless, be invalidated by the federal proxy rule X-
14A-7. 52 Noting the potential limiting effects of state law on fed-
eral securities legislation, the court espoused the proposition that
state corporate law cannot be interpreted to frustrate the purpose
of the proxy rule. As Judge Biggs noted:
If this minor provision may be employed as Transamerica seeks to employ it,
it will serve to circumvent the intent of Congress in enacting the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. It was the intent of Congress to require fair opportu-
nity for the operation of corporate suffrage. The control of the great corpo-
rations by a very few persons was the abuse at which Congress struck in
enacting section 14(a). We entertain no doubt that Proxy Rule X-14A-7 rep-
resents a proper exercise of the authority conferred by Congress on the
Commission under section 14(a). This seems to us to end the matter. The
power conferred upon the Commission by Congress cannot be frustrated by
a corporate by-law.
58
The Transamerica decision was fully consistent with the earlier
administrative pronouncements by the SEC. The court agreed
50. 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
51. The Third Circuit held that the by-law granting discretionary power to the direc-
tors was, at least when applied "in all its strictness," invalid under state law. Id. at 518.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citation omitted).
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with the Commission that the basis of the "proper subject" test
was state law. However, no state law provision could grant direc-
tors a power so broad and sweeping as to effectively nullify the
federal shareholder proposal rule. This supremacy doctrine, com-
bined with the Commission's utilization of the "by-law" and
"precatory proposal" exceptions, effectively established a new
body of federal corporate law principles concerning shareholders'
rights,54 and thereby preserved the vitality of the proposal rule.
C. The Emergence of the Public Policy Resolution
Most of the shareholder proposals presented to management
in the early years of the rule were limited to requests and/or sug-
gestions about specific corporate business activities. The "social
resolution," which has become controversial today, was not yet
recognized by shareholders as a proper subject for independent
shareholder action. Baldwin Bane, Director of the SEC's Division
of Corporate Finance, had already stated that "matters which are
of a general political, social or economic nature ... .were not
proper subjects for [shareholder] action."55 With social and politi-
cal resolutions cast aside, the Commission and the courts were
able to freely promote the liberal use of the proposal rule so as to
maximize the voice of shareholders in the governance of large
corporations.5
Beginning in the early 1950's the SEC observed, for the first
time, an increase in the number of shareholder proposals based
on the social and political views of the proponents rather than the
activities of the issuer's business. Later, in 1952, the Commission
54. Professor Loss noted that the Commission was forced to develop its own concep-
tion of shareholder rights given the fact that "there is simply not very much state law to
use as a guide in these matters." 2 L. Loss, SEcuRiIs REGULAMON 905 (2d ed. 1961); See
also Schwartz, supra note 6, at 440.
55. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-3638, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,995 (1945). The
statement was made in response to a series of shareholder resolutions which had asked:
that dividends paid to shareholders should be free of federal income tax; that the antitrust
laws should be revised; and that all ensuing federal legislation providing for workers and
farmers to be represented should be made to apply equally to investors. The SEC staff
ruled that these proposals could be omitted from company proxy materials as not "proper
subjects" within the meaning of Rule X-14A-7. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d at 516-18.
56. This liberal attitude regarding the proposal rule was simply a logical extension of
the theory of shareholder democracy, recognized by the SEC when it promulgated Rule
X-14A-7. See Propp, supra note 3, at 102; Manne, supra note 3, at 484; Schwartz & Weiss,
supra note 3, at 638; Loomis & Rubman, supra note 27, at 170; text accompanying note 37.
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amended Rule 14a-8, the successor to X-14A-7, to prevent what it
perceived as a potential abuse of the proxy process. 57 The new
amendments allowed management to exclude a proposal if it
"clearly appearfed that it was submitted] primarily for the pur-
pose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, so-
cial or similar causes."5 8 It appeared to be a simple codification of
the staff's earlier opinion regarding proper subjects. 9 In effect,
however, the rule allowed management to omit a proposal that
was an appropriate subject for shareholder action if it was moti-
vated by inappropriate purposes."
Several years later, following more revisions of the rule, two
significant developments forced the SEC to reexamine the entire
scope and purpose of the shareholder proposal rule-the decision
in Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC8 1 and the Campaign
to Make General Motors Responsible.82
In Medical Committee, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that an SEC decision regarding whether a
particular proposal could be excluded under 14a-8 was review-
able.8 The staff had approved a request by the Dow Chemical
Company to exclude a stockholder proposal which sought to pro-
hibit the company's sale of napalm to the military for use in Viet-
nam. Although the court did not decide the exclusion question,
the court did indicate its willingness to permit shareholder chal-
lenges to corporate activities which it regarded as questionable or
57. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-4775, 17 Fed. Reg. 11,430 (1952).
58. Id. This provision is frequently referred to as the "general cause" test. The rule
amendments were cast in the same form as an earlier SEC release which stated that "mat-
ters which are of a general political, social, or economic nature" were not proper subjects
for shareholder action. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-3638, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,995
(1946). The SEC later relied on this release in 1951 to allow Greyhound Corp. to exclude a
resolution recommending the abolition of segregated seating in the South-even though
Greyhound itself used the practice. This "no-action" decision was upheld in federal district
court. Peck v. Greyhound, 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). The Release was later codified
in 1952 into Rule 14a-8. See supra note 57.
59. See supra note 55.
60. See State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 330-31, 191 N.W.2d
406, 412 (1971) (shareholder's request to inspect corporate books and records denied be-
cause motivated by a social purpose unrelated to the business of the corporation).
61. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir.), vacated and remanded as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1970).
62. See Schwartz, supra note 6. The Project on Corporate Responsibility chose GM to
be the target of their initial effort to "test... the ability of the corporate and economic
system to reform itself." Id. at 423.
63. 432 F.2d at 676.
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unethical." The court observed:
We think that there is a clear and compelling distinction between manage-
ment's legitimate need for freedom to apply its expertise in matters of day-
to-day business judgment, and management's patently illegitimate claim of
power to treat modern corporations with their vast resources as personal
satrapies implementing personal political or moral predilictions. It could be
scarcely argued that management is more qualified or more entitled to make
these kinds of decisions than the shareholders who are the true beneficial
owners of the corporation; and it seems equally implausible that an applica-
tion of the proxy rules which permitted such a result could be harmonized
with the philosophy of corporate democracy which Congress embodied in
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 65
Shortly after the Medical Committee decision, the Project on
Corporate Responsibility initiated Campaign GM. This campaign
attempted to include nine resolutions in General Motor's proxy
solicitation materials. Seven of the nine proposals were drafted in
the form of social issues, asking for reform in the areas of safety,
pollution and minority hiring. GM excluded these proposals from
the proxy with SEC approval."' GM accepted two resolutions that
consisted of: (1) an amendment to the by-laws to increase the
number of directors by three;67 and (2) the creation of a Share-
holders' Committee for Corporate Responsibility consisting of 15
to 25 representatives of different interest groups unconnected
with the automobile industry. 8 These resolutions apparently were
easier to justify as "proper subjects" for shareholder action.
The GM proposals, as well as those advanced in the Medical
Committee case, presented a strong challenge to the continued via-
bility of the provision that permitted exclusion of proposals that
were introduced "primarily for the purpose" of promoting gen-
eral social, economic or political goals. The strength of this chal-
lenge should not be measured by the number of proxy votes re-
ceived by these proposals but rather by the conceptual link they
64. Id. at 681. See Deutsch, Perlman v. Feldman: A Case Study in Contemporary Corporate
Legal History, 8 U. Micm. J.L. REF. 1, 58-59 (1974).
65. 432 F.2d at 681.
66. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 451-54.
67. Id. at 424.
68. The Project on Corporate Responsibility indicated that these new directorships
should be filled with "public-interest directors." However, legal counsel to Campaign GM
decided to omit this objective from the Campaign so as to avoid the rigors of an election
proxy fight. The two admitted resolutions received, respectively, 2.44% and 7.19% of the
votes cast. Id. at 422.
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make between corporate policy decisions and public policy con-
cerns. The courts and the SEC would no longer apply a blanket
exclusion to shareholder proposals that were directed solely to'
noncorporate ends. Public policy resolutions became eligible for
inclusion in the proxy materials so long as they were materially
relevant to some aspect of the issuer's business.69 This develop-
ment represented a significant expansion of the previous adminis-
trative and judicial attitudes on the legitimacy of public policy
resolutions.
In 1972, following a staff reexamination of the propriety of
allowing investors to use the proposal mechanism as a forum for
social and political dialogue at the corporate level, the Commis-
sion codified its new interpretative position.70 The Commission re-
vised Rule 14a-8(c)(2)(ii) to allow management to omit a proposal
that
[c]onsists of a recommendation, request or mandate that action be taken
with respect to any matters, including a general economic, political, racial,
religious, social or similar cause, that is not significantly related to the busi-
ness of the issuer or is not within the control of the issuer . . . 1
On the surface, the revision appeared to be a setback to the legiti-
macy of shareholder activism. The language of the exclusion was
more precise and appeared to impose new standards. In practice,
however, the rule change was a reinforcement of the Commis-
sion's new position on public policy resolutions. The 1972 revision
no longer allowed the staff to examine the subjective motivations
of a proponent, the standard of the 1952 amendments. Instead, it
encouraged the staff to develop a body of objective standards re-
garding what is a proper subject for action by security holders.
This was an important administrative step. As two commentators
pointed out: "[T]he SEC at least tacitly acknowledged that it was
appropriate for shareholders to use the proxy process to raise so-
cial issues, so long as there was a sufficient nexus between those is-
69. The SEC frequently rejected management's argument for exclusion under the
"general cause" test by arguing that management had failed to demonstrate that the share-
holder's primary purpose "clearly appear[ed]" to promote a general cause. With this argu-
ment the SEC was able to deny exclusion for many proposals that were convincingly moti-
vated by social, economic and political concerns. See Comment, SEC Shareholder Proposal
Rule 14a-8, supra note 3, at 791.
70. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-9784, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,178 (1972).
71. Id. at 23,179.
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sues and the business of the corporation. '7 2
The 1972 amendments, fueled by the public attention on
Campaign GM, signalled an increase of shareholder proposals on
public policy issues .7 The corporate community responded to this
increase by requesting the SEC in 1976 to inject a "one-percent"
test into the "significantly related" language of the general cause
provision.7 4 This economic standard would require the staff to ex-
clude any resolution as not "significantly related to the business of
the issuer" if the subject of the proposal related to less than one
percent of the- issuer's total business operations. Although the
SEC had already adopted this approach in several no-action let-
ters, 7 5 the Commission refused to codify an "economic signifi-
cance" standard in Rule 14a-8. The SEC realized that there were
many instances in which the matter involved in a proposal was sig-
nificant to an issuer's business even though such significance was
not apparent from an economic viewpoint.
7 6
The Commission's decision not to inject economic criteria
into the "significantly related" provision symbolized the SEC com-
mitment to a proxy process that affords shareholders with the op-
portunity to question management on a broad range of corporate
issues and public policies. As two commentators observed: "Once
the ['significantly related'] standard is unmoored from a conven-
tional economic materiality test, socially significant proposals seem
to be as 'significantly related to the business of the issuer' as are
traditional shareholder concerns.1
77
The SEC subsequently found that many social proposals made
to various companies met the "significantly related" standard. A
72. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 3, at 657.
73. In 1973, 40 social responsibility resolutions were voted upon. IRRC Report, supra
note 7, at 3. This figure climbed to 138 in 1976. Id. Since 1976 the number of public
responsibility resolutions submitted to U.S. companies has remained relatively constant. See
supra note 7.
74. See Propp, supra note 3, at 108.
75. The SEC first used the "one percent" test when it issued several no-action letters
to corporations which had received resolutions questioning their compliance with the Arab
boycott of Israel. To determine whether these resolutions were "significantly related" to
the issuer's business, the Commission focused on the issue of whether the percentage of
total sales, earnings and assets attributed to the boycott was less than one percent. See, e.g.,
Division Letter to Libby-Owens-Ford Co., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fra. Sa._ L. REP.
(CCH) 80,437 (Feb. 3, 1976). See also infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
76. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994 (1976).
77. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 3, at 662.
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proposal to Newmont Mining Corp. to amend its charter to pre-
vent operations in Namibia was deemed significantly related to
Newmont's business because it called for the company to cease op-
erations in a specific area.7  A proposal to Marriott Corp., re-
questing a ban on charitable contributions that were not in fur-
therance of the corporation's business, was held to be
"significantly related" despite their economic immateriality.79
And a proposal to Citicorp to terminate all of the company's
South African loan commitments was upheld even though the
company's business in South Africa was less than 1% of its total
business.80
These illustrations, as well as the prior SEC rulings and judi-
cial decisions, demonstrate that a balancing process between two
competing interests occurs each time the rule is used or modified.
The SEC must, on the one hand, acknowledge the management
interest in an inexpensive, non-confrontational soliciting process.
On the other hand, the Commission must remain cognizant of the
shareholders' interest in maintaining an effective voice in the gov-
erning process.
Prior to the recent rule changes, the SEC maintained an equi-
table balance between these two competing interests by affirming
the Commission's commitment to two basic propositions. First, the
shareholder proposal rule was an effective, perhaps indispensable,
instrument of facilitating communication between management
and its stockholders. And second, given the widespread public in-
terest in social issues and the increasing concern for the vitality of
78. Newmont Mining Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SE C.L. REP. (CCH) 1
79,325, at 82,985 (March 20, 1973).
79. The staff advised Marriott Corp.:
Although the representations made by the Company's counsel as to the per-
centage of revenues and profits represented by charitable contributions tend to
indicate that the subject matter of this proposal is not of economic significance
to the Company's business, this is not the sole consideration under Rule
14a-8(c)(2)(ii). As indicated in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12598,
there are many instances in which the matter involved in the proposal is signifi-
cant to an issuer's business, even though such significance may not be apparent
from an economic viewpoint.
Marriott Corp., [1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,804, at 87,097 (Sept.
17, 1976).
80. Citicorp, [1978 Transfer Binder] FEn. SC.m L. RE'. (CCH) 81,520 (Feb. 23,
1978). See also Motorola Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SE.. L. REP. (CCH) 81,521
(Feb. 23, 1978) (same facts and decision as Citicorp ruling).
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corporate democracy, Rule 14a-8 played a unique and important
role in the governance of large, modern corporations with respect
to social and political issues. Both principles represent the historic
legitimacy of Rule 14a-8 as a means to effect the broad goal of
corporate democracy.
II. THE IMPETUS FOR REGULATORY REFORM
In recent years, the business community has grown increas-
ingly impatient with the SEC efforts to maintain a fair balance be-
tween management and shareholder interests."' Many corporate
executives believe that the Commission has wholeheartedly em-
braced theories of corporate democracy and accountability and ig-
nored the abusive nature of the proposal process to issuers.8 2 The
result of this liberal regulatory posture, they contend, is that
shareholders have been given the right to utilize corporate proxy
materials to raise issues better left to the political process. 83
To strike a new balance between management and share-
holder interests, corporate leaders recently pressured the Reagan
administration to provide regulatory relief to issuers and relieve
the administrative burden on the SEC. They cited several policy
considerations in support of the demand for more restrictive
proxy rules. The first argument, and the most popular, was the
claim that the proposal process had become too costly to issuers."
Under Rule 14a-8, a corporation that decides to include a propo-
sal in the proxy statement must bear the cost of printing the pro-
posal and management's response to it,8 5 as well as the time and
expense of tabulating the proxy returns. If the issuer elects to ex-
clude the proposal, the company still incurs the expense of justify-
ing this omission to the SEC." The costs associated with either
inclusion or exclusion, it is argued, had become excessive. The
81. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 3, at 638 & n.16.
82. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 3; Black & Sparks, supra note 3; and Propp, supra
note 8.
83. See Black & Sparks, supra note 3, at 972.
84. See supra note 16.
85. Id.
86. The pre-clearance procedure of Rule 14a-8 requires a company which has elected
to omit a proposal to file copies of the proposal and the reasons for the omission with the
SEC. If these reasons include questions of law, a supporting opinion of counsel must also be




contention here is that the majority shareholders have been
forced to bear the costs of proposals which have traditionally re-
ceived support from only a small minority. 7 Executives have also
displayed concern regarding the potential for an "abuse" of the
proposal process. Without meaningful restrictions on the use of
Rule 14a-8, proponents could arguably flood the corporation with
a multitude of proposals simply to harass management or advance
their own frivolous, individualistic causes. 88 There is no economic
incentive to impede this abuse because the proponents do not
have to bear the costs of the proposal machinery.
Another policy argument that was made in support of the
more restrictive rule provisions was the assertion that the new
rule changes could streamline the appearance of the proxy to
make it more understandable to shareholders. The thrust of the
argument is that shareholder understanding of the proxy material
has been significantly diminished as the increasing number of pro-
posals make the proxy more complex. Without a regulatory re-
sponse to this problem, many shareholders, it is suggested, would
be unable to cast a meaningful vote on any of the issues raised by
the proxy.8'
The final criticism of the rule was that the SEC has allowed
social activists to use the proxy mechanism for objectives which
were never intended to be appropriate ends of Rule 14a-8. The
corporate community contends that the "social proponent" is
more interested in using the proposal rule as a forum for narrow
social issues than as a popularly-based method of communicating
valid shareholder concerns to top-level management.90 Rule
14a-8, it is argued, was never intended "to permit stockholders to
obtain the consensus of other stockholders with respect to matters
which are of a general political, social or economic nature. Other
forums exist for the presentation of such views."' 1
These perceived misuses of the proxy system prompted the
corporate community to pressure the SEC to exercise more re-




91. This statement was made by an SEC staff member in 1945 and is frequently cited




straint in granting shareholder access to the proxy machinery.
Several rule modifications were recommended. The most sought-
after revision was an amendment to require each proponent to
own a minimum amount of stock for a minimum period of time in
order to be eligible to submit a proposal. Directors believed that
this requirement would prevent a social activist from "buying a
ticket" to the annual meetings of many different companies in or-
der to present an individual cause. 92 The SEC was also asked to
revise the rule to limit the number of proposals which could be
resubmitted the following year. Suggested revisions required a
proponent to receive a threshold percentage of the total share-
holder vote in favor of the resolution in order to be eligible to
resubmit the same proposal for the following year.
In 1976, the SEC responded to these suggestions and made
an effort to prevent the perceived abuse of the shareholder propo-
sal process.9 New revisions of Rule 14 a-8 subsequently required
that a proponent be a beneficial owner of a security entitled to be
voted on his proposal, and that he must continue to own the se-
curity through the date of the meeting.9 The changes also al-
lowed a corporation to exclude any proposal that was substantially
the same as a proposal which received less than three percent of
the vote when submitted the year before.9 5
Although this revision was, in theory, a significant step to re-
duce the overwhelming number of social proposals, it did not
have an appreciable effect on the actual volume of these propos-
als. A majority of proponents seeking to advance social and politi-
cal issues were still able to pass the threshold requirements of
14a-8.9 ' This sobering fact led the Commission to initiate new re-
visions of the rule in 1983.
Under the guise of the Proxy Review Program, the Commis-
sion began rulemaking proceedings on the entire framework gov-
erning the security holder proposal process.Y Initially, the staff
92. See supra note 16.
93. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994 (1976).
94. Id.
95. Id. S.E.C. Rule 14a-8(c)(12).
96. See supra note 7.
97. Over the past several years, the Securities and Exchange Commission has initiated
a number of major rulemaking proceedings designed to simplify, in a manner consistent
with the protection of investors, many of the complex disclosure systems which have
evolved under the federal securities laws. This process was responsible for producing the
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asked for public comment on whether the shareholder proposal
process should be maintained under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 or left to regulation under state law.98 After deciding that
federal enforcement was more appropriate, the Commission in-
vited public comment on three alternative proposals to revise
Rule 14a-8.91
Proposal I retained the basic statutory framework of the cur-
rent shareholder proposal rule but called for important proce-
dural changes, a substantive alteration of the staff's former posi-
tion on exclusions, the imposition of stricter eligibility
requirements for proponents and the extension of filing dead-
lines.100 Proposal II granted the issuer the right to vary the proce-
dures specified in the shareholder proposal rule with the approval
of its security holders.101 This proposal permitted issuers to estab-
lish their own eligibility criteria for proponents, as well as the sub-
stantive bases for exclusion. It would essentially empower a com-
pany's management to establish its own "rules of the game" for
filing resolutions, subject to certain minimum standards pre-
scribed by the Commission. Proposal III required the inclusion of
any proposal that was proper under state law and which did not
involve an election of directors.102 It also imposed a numerical
limit on the total number of shareholder proposals required to be
included in the proxy statement so as to reduce the costs associ-
ated with the proxy process.103 This proposal would permit share-
holders unfettered access to the issuer's proxy statement.
The substantive differences between these three proposals re-
Integrated Disclosure System and Regulation D. The Integrated Disclosure System stream-
lined two of the three major disclosure systems-the system for the registration of securi-
ties under the Securities Act of 1933 and the continuous reporting system under the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934. Regulation D, adopted by the Commission in 1982, was
designed to achieve uniformity between state and federal exemptions and to facilitate capi-
tal formation. Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (1982).
More recently, the Commission has begun to re-examine the third major disclosure sys-
tem-the rules, forms, and schedules relating to the solicitation of proxies. The Proxy
Review Program is designed to reduce the burden of compliance with the proxy rules, to
increase shareholder understanding of the proxy materials and, overall, to make the proxy
solicitation process more efficient and straightforward.








veal the difficult balancing process which the Commission has had
to undertake when handling the shareholder proposal rule. Pro-
posal II was drafted from an issuer's perspective, seeking to re-
duce the considerable time, effort, and cost associated with the
proxy solicitation process. It is premised on the assumption that
the board is responsible for the operation of the business and that
the role of the shareholder should be limited thereby. In direct
contrast, Proposal III is premised on the belief that the security
holder process serves the public interest and preserves one of the
few remaining elements of shareholder democracy. Advocates of
this proposal, mainly socially-conscious investors and public inter-
est groups, believe that the shareholder proposal rule guarantees
accountability in corporate governance by forcing top level deci-
sionmakers to respond to the interests of the security holders.
The middle ground between these two positions would ap-
pear to be, at least from its face, Proposal I. It neither vests man-
agement with complete control of the proposal process nor grants
the shareholders unfettered access to an issuer's proxy materials.
By also retaining the basic framework of the rule, Proposal I does
not forego the SEC's role as a referee between the competing in-
terests of the two contestants. It attempts to preserve the proposal
process as an institution of corporate democracy while, at the
same time, promising to reduce the tendency of a small group of
proponents to abuse this process. According to a staff statement,
Proposal I was an attempt to eliminate a fairly modern problem
whereby
a few proponents ... use the rule as a publicity mechanism to further per-
sonal interests that are unrelated to the interests of security holders as secur-
ity holders and that certain sophisticated proponents, who submit proposals
annually to a variety of issuers, are able to require the inclusion of a propo-
sal which has generated little security holder interest by simply changing its
form or minimally varying its coverage. The rule was not designed to bur-




Of the three proposals advanced by the Commission, Proposal
I received the most support from those commenting on the
rulemaking proceeding. 10 5 Proposal I was ultimately selected as
104. Id. at 47,422 n.8.
105. The Commission received 897 letters of comment. In these letters, 115 commen-
tators expressed support for Proposal I. Proposal II was favored by 24 commentators, al-
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the basis for the new rule revisions." 6 The changes became effec-
tive January 1, 1984.
The new rules require a shareholder to own at least 1% or
$1,000 in the market value of a security for a minimum of one
year prior to the date on which the proponent intends to submit a
proposal. °" Furthermore, the number of proposals that a share-
holder may submit to an issuer in any one year has been reduced
from two to one.108 Rules regarding the resubmission of proposals
have been similarly tightened. A shareholder is allowed to resub-
mit a defeated proposal to the same company only if that proposal
received at least 5% of the vote the first year, 8% the second and
10% every year thereafter.10 9
All of these rule changes represent a significant departure
from past SEC policy. The former rule did not require a mini-
mum investment or holding period, it allowed each shareholder to
submit two proposals per year, and it required a proponent to re-
ceive a 3% vote the first year, 6% the second, and 10% every year
thereafter to be eligible to resubmit substantially the same
proposal.1 01
In addition to the eligibility changes, the new rules will signif-
icantly alter the Commission's interpretation of several substantive
exclusions. The "personal grievance" exclusion was amended to
allow an issuer to exclude any proposal which is crafted to further
a personal interest not shared by the body of shareholders at
large.1  The SEC injected an "economic test" into the exclusion
provided by paragraph (c)(5) for proposals dealing with matters
not "significantly related" to the company's business.112 The "or-
dinary business" exclusion was changed to make it more difficult
though there were an additional 18 letters which indicated some support for the concept
behind Proposal II. Only 6 commentators supported the adoption of Proposal III, with an
additional 16 commentators indicating support for the theory underlying the proposal.
The remaining letters either expressed no preference for a specific proposal or suggested
that there should be no change in the rule. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-20091,
48 Fed. Reg. 38,218 nn.1-4 (1983).
106. Id.
107. S.E.C. Rule 14a-8(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(1) (1984). Holdings of co-pro-
ponents will be aggregated in determining the includability of a proposal.
108. S.E.C. Rule 14a-8(a)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(4) (1984).
109. S.E.C. Rule 14a-8(c)(12), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(12) (1984).
110. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-20091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218 (1983).
111. S.E.C. Rule 14a-8(c)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(4) (1984).
112. S.E.C. Rule 14a-8(c)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1984).
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for shareholders to solicit reports from the company.113 And, the
Commission revised the "mootness" exclusion to allow an issuer
to exclude any proposal which the company had "substantially im-
plemented" rather than "fully effected," the previous standard.","
The remainder of this Comment will examine the effective-
ness of the SEC's professed balancing process by examining the
impact of the new 14a-8 amendments on the ability of sharehold-
ers to influence corporate decisionmaking.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE REVISIONS ON CORPORATE DEMOCRACY
The adoption of the 1984 amendments to Rule 14a-8 was
based on the Commission's belief that the proposal process had
been abused in the past and that these particular revisions could
reduce or eliminate this abuse.1 1 5 The revisions, which were vigor-
ously supported by the business community, were intended specifi-
cally to mitigate the cost of the proposal mechanism for issuers. 16
The rule was also designed to provide regulatory relief to the
Commission by creating a simpler and more predictable regula-
tory process.11 7
These regulatory objectives were supposed to be obtained by
tightening the eligibility criteria and the exclusionary interpreta-
tions contained in the rule. The new "1% or $1,000" threshold
requirement, the higher resubmission percentages, and the nar-
rower staff interpretations of the substantive exclusions were
designed to give issuers and the Commission greater latitude to
exclude questionable shareholder proposals. The subsequent re-
duction in the actual number of proposals submitted to issuers
would then reduce the overall issuers' cost of the proposal mecha-
nism. The infusion of objective standards into paragraph (c)
would also enable the SEC staff to summarily dismiss more pro-
posals-saving the time and expense associated with distributing
no-action letters.116 Unfortunately, these ambitious aims were
vastly overstated.
113. S.E.C. Rule 14a-8(c)(7), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1984).
114. S.E.C. Rule 14a-8(c)(10), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(10) (1984).
115. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19135, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420 (1982).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. The Commission staff spent approximately one staff year (1208 hours) in process-
ing materials submitted to it pursuant to Rule 14a-8 during the 1982 proxy season. Id.
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This Comment will demonstrate, through an examination of
the most significant rule revisions, that the Commission misinter-
preted much of the data and the policy considerations raised by
the rulemaking proceeding. Two specific defects in the rulemak-
ing process will be alluded to: (1) the new rule is based upon the
fallacy that the proposal process has been abused in the past; and
(2) the rule revisions are premised on a spurious belief that the
changes will materially reduce the overall cost and burden of the
proposal process to both issuers and the Commission. This section
will also argue that, in a larger context, the new rule has upset the
fundamental balance, achieved by the SEC during the past forty
years, between the management interest in an efficient proxy so-
licitation process and the shareholder interest in the preservation
of an intracorporate dialogue. Several theoretical problems raised
by the new rule will also be explored.
A. The Fallacy of Abuse
In the Proposing Release for the new rule revisions, the staff
provided only three statistics in support of the rulemaking pro-
ceeding. They were: (1) the available information indicated that
only a limited number of the approximately 9,000 companies
whose securities are registered with the Commission actually re-
ceive proposals in any given year;119 (2) statistics compiled by the
American Society of Corporate Secretaries revealed that in the
year ending June 30, 1981, 991 proposals were submitted to 376
companies and that this number was significantly lower in 1982;120
and (3) in 1982 only 43 companies received 5 or more propos-
als."1" These statistics, when viewed together, simply fail to sup-
port the Commission's theory that the process was being abused.
Only four percent of the total companies registered with the
Commission actually received a proposal last year, and this figure
is on the decline. For those companies which did receive one or
more proposals, management elected to contest only 39% of
119. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19135, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420, 47,423
(1982).
120. Preliminary figures for the year ending June 30, 1982 indicate that approxi-
mately 850 proposals were submitted to 300 companies. Id.
121. Id.
122. In 1981, only 376 companies of the total 9,000 companies registered with the
Commission received a proposal. Id. See also supra note 120.
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them.12 These figures hardly reveal that corporations have been
inundated with a tide of resolutions.1 2 ' To the contrary, they
seem to suggest that shareholder proposals are a relatively rare
occurrence. At the very least, this limited statistical proof raises
doubts about the sufficiency of this evidence to serve as the basis
for a major rulemaking initiative. 12 5
Perhaps to ignore the import of this factual evidence, the bus-
iness community has argued, in the alternative, that the abusive
nature of the proposal process is more accurately reflected by the
number of proposals submitted to a particular issuer rather than
the total number of resolutions submitted to all corporations. This
model allegedly demonstrates that malevolent shareholders have
proposed hundreds of resolutions simply to harass a few, targeted
corporations. The problem with this model, however, is that it
lacks any factual foundation at the present time. Only 43 compa-
nies received five or more proposals in 1982.212 This figure repre-
sents less than one percent of the total issuers registered with the
Commission. More significantly, this figure was the only evidence
produced by the SEC in the Proposing Release to support the the-
ory of the "malevolent shareholder." This data suggests that the
Commission imprudently responded to the fear of abuse rather
than the existence of it. Administrative practice generally requires
a specter of abuse to materialize before imposing new regulatory
reforms on an entire class of corporations.
1 27
The statistical data regarding the actual cost of the proposal
process to issuers also fails to justify the adoption of the new rule.
The SEC has previously requested information from issuers con-
cerning the cost of complying with the former rule.128 The Com-
123. The total number of contested proposals was 387. The total number of proposals
submitted was 991. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19135, supra note 119, at
47,423, 47,424.
124. See also supra note 7.
125. James Heard, of the Investor Responsibility Research Center, recognized this
problem. He stated: "The Commission apparently assumes that the current system is
widely abused and excessively costly to management. But it has provided little factual evi-
dence to support many of the changes." Statement of James Heard, quoted in Lydenberg,
supra note 23, at 2, col. 3.
126. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19135, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420, 47,423
(1982).
127. Cf. Comment, Proxy Rule 14a-8: Omission of Shareholder Proposals, 84 HARv. L. Rxv.
700, 720 (1971).
128. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19135, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420, 47,423
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mission received only one response to its request.129 American
Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T) indicated that the cost
of including 5 proposals in its proxy statement was $22,250 per
proposal while the cost for the 11 proposals excluded from the
proxy material was $3,740 per proposal. 8 This data does not
constitute a sufficient sample of the corporate population with
which to conclude that the proposal process is too costly for issu-
ers. A sole response from one company does not necessarily re-
present the average cost incurred by all issuers. If the AT&T re-
sponse reveals anything at all, it suggests that the actual cost of
the proposal process to AT&T and its shareholders is miniscule
when viewed in relation to other areas of corporate
expenditure.131
The preceding analysis demonstrates the misguided approach
of the latest 14a-8 rulemaking proceedings. The Commission has
imposed significant restrictions on shareholder access to the pro-
posal rule based upon the inaccurate theory that the proxy pro-
cess was abused in the past. The reasons remain unclear as to why
the Commission would adopt such a bold new set of revisions
without more documentary support. One possible explanation is
that the statistical data collected by the staff was obscured by the
media and corporate dramatization of the process. To be sure,
shareholder resolutions have produced widely publicized struggles
between the "activists" (or "corporate guerilla fighters") and cor-
porate management, thereby increasing the focus of the public on
the annual meeting of shareholders. The Commission may have
finally succumbed to the weight of the corporate pressure and me-
dia attention.
B. The Practical Limitations of the New Rule 14a-8
As mentioned above, the new Rule 14a-8 was designed to re-




131. A comparison between the cost of the proposal process to AT&T ($22,250 per
proposal) and other areas of corporate expenditure, e.g., corporate political contributions,
reveals that compliance with the proxy rule is relatively inexpensive. These expenditures




by reducing the number of proposals submited to issuers and by
making the staff's regulatory role more objective and predictable.
A close examination, however, of three specific rule revisions
reveals that there are several practical limits on the ability of the
Rule to accomplish these objectives.
1. Rule 14a-8(aX1Xi): Minimum investment and holding period.
The most significant amendment to Rule 14a-8 is the new require-
ment that a proponent own at least 1% or $1,000 in the market
value of a security for a minimum of one year prior to the date
upon which the proponent intends to submit a proposal.3 2 This
provision was specifically designed to eliminate the abuse of the
proposal rule by requiring shareholders, who put the company to
the expense of including a proposal in a proxy statement, to have
some measured financial interest in the company.33 The target of
this regulatory scheme is the "gadfly" proponent; a transient
stockholder who purchases small amounts of stock from several
companies as a means of "buying a ticket" to the annual meetings.
The SEC implementation of a "financial interest" test does
not represent an innovative development in corporate law. Some
state statutes now require shareholders to demonstrate a financial
interest in their corporations as a prerequisite to participation in
the governance of these companies."3" Security-for-expenses stat-
utes, for example, often require a shareholder bringing a deriva-
tive suit to post bond for litigation expenses, including attorney's
fees, unless the shareholder holds five percent of the outstanding
shares or the shares have a specified market value of $50,000 or
more."3 5 By classifying the shareholders by the size of their stock
holdings, these statutes attempt to discourage shareholders, who
lack a significant financial interest in a company, from harassing
that corporation with frivolous and expensive litigation.'3 "
132. S.E.C. Rule 14a-8(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(1) (1984).
133. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19135, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420 (1982).
134. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1963 and Supp. 1983-1984); CA.
CORP. CODE § 800(c)-(f) (West 1977 and Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT. ANNs. § 64-223(c)
(1980).
135. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 627 (McKinney 1963 and Supp. 1983-1984).
136. Commenting upon the New York security-for-expenses statute, the Appellate Di-
vision, Second Department, once noted:
A stockholder motivated by personal gain instead of the welfare of the corpora-
don, it was thought by the sponsors of the legislation, would be deterred from
bringing a spurious action, when the onus of the expense incurred by the cor-
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The practical benefits which are derived from "financial in-
terest" tests, as in the security-for-expenses example, are readily
apparent and widely accepted by students of corporate law. From
a theoretical perspective, however, these classification schemes
should raise some fundamental concerns. Financial interest stan-
dards, perhaps unintentionally, alter the basic legal relationship
between the management of a corporation and its shareholders.
These eligibility rules have made the rights of stock ownership
contingent upon an arbitrary prerequisite of minimum stock hold-
ings. As a result, company management can exclude a share-
holder, with small stock holdings, from the corporate governance
process without regard to the merit of the shareholder's concerns.
The participation of such shareholders in the corporate govern-
ance process can be an effective tool for enforcing shareholder
rights. As a result, the duties collectively owed to the shareholders
by management can become more difficult to enforce.
States which have adopted security-for-expenses statutes, or
other provisions utilizing financial interest criteria, apparently see
a compelling need for these rules despite their theoretical weak-
nesses. The staggering cost of derivative suit litigation and the
abusive nature of strike suits simply outweigh any concerns for the
loss of shareholder rights. The exceptional circumstances of deriv-
ative suits, therefore, dictate the justification for abridging tradi-
tional shareholder rights. By incorporating a financial interest re-
quirement in Rule 14a-8, the SEC apparently draws an analogy
between the harassing potential of derivative suits and the abusive
use of the proxy rules. This analogy is unfounded. The pressure
exerted by shareholders through the proposal process is not of the
same magnitude as the pressure exerted by those who bring deriv-
ative suits to question or challenge certain management decisions.
As previously discussed, data collected on the use of Rule
14a-8 suggests that the proposal process has not been abused in
the past-particularly not by "gadfly" proponents. 87 To the con-
trary, the leading sponsors of public policy resolutions have been
poration in defending it would be ultimately cast on the plaintiff as a conse-
quence of the exposure of the action as meritless.
Roach v. Franchises Int'l, Inc., 32 A.D.2d 247, 250, 300 N.Y.S.2d. 630, 633 (2d Dept.
1969).
137. Karpen, Minding the Corporate Conscience 1981, Council on Economic Priorities
Newsletter (Apr. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Minding the Corporate Conscience].
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well-organized and well-financed institutions. As one observer
pointed out: "Since the mid-Seventies, the leading sponsors and
co-sponsors of political and social proxy resolutions have been the
17 Protestant denominations and 170 Roman Catholic orders af-
filiated with the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility.
Together these church groups hold about $6 billion in corporate
debt and equity."""
It is difficult to imagine how the new eligibilty criteria can
preclude these large organizations from submitting social and po-
litical shareholder resolutions. The "1% or $1,000" requirement
simply becomes a meaningless threshold when the large financial
resources of these organizations are considered. This revelation
suggests that the SEC justification for constructing a tighter exclu-
sionary net was based on administrative discomfort with illusion-
ary "gadflies."
For those individual stockholders who are legitimately inter-
ested in submitting public policy resolutions, the minimum invest-
ment and minimum holding period requirements should not pre-
sent an insurmountable barrier. According to the revised Rule
14a-8(a)(1)(i), the holdings of co-proponents will be aggregated
when determining the includability of a proposal. This provision
will allow a proponent to join efforts with other stockholders in
order to meet the eligibility requirements. The aggregation allow-
ance is a major regulatory concession, perhaps providing small
stockholders with the means of circumventing paragraph (a)(1)(i)
entirely.
In sum, the extensive financial resources of the leading public
policy sponsors, combined with the aggregation allowance for in-
dividual stockholders, significantly hampers the ability of Rule
14a-8(c)(1)(i) to reduce the number of proposals submitted to issu-
ers annually. The extent of this regulatory failure, however, is not
limited to the Rule's failure to accomplish its professed objectives.
On a more serious level, the Rule appears to patently discriminate
against individual stockholders who have used the proposal pro-
cess responsibly in the past. The imposition of this burden on mi-
nority shareholders may not always be unjustified but, given the
138. Vogel, The Bull Market in Political Proxy Resolutions, Wall St. J., May 18, 1981, at
26, col. 2. For a profile of the proponents who submitted public policy resolutions in 1981,
see Minding the Corporate Conscience 1981, supra note 137.
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lack of benefits derived from this particular rule change, it is ar-
guably unwarranted under these circumstances.
2. Rule 14a-8(cX5): No significant relation to issuer's business.
Prior to the recent rule amendments, paragraph (c)(5) of the Rule
permitted an issuer to exclude from the corporation's proxy state-
ment and proxy form any proposal that dealt with "a matter that
[was] not significantly related to the issuer's business.
1113 Most of
the difficulties associated with the staff's interpretation of this pro-
vision centered around attempts to establish an objective standard
for determining the circumstances under which the subject matter
of a proposal would be deemed "significantly related.
140
In 1976, one such attempt raised considerable controversy.
The Commission tried to implement a standard based on the eco-
nomic significance of the subject matter of the proposal. Through
a series of letters, the staff agreed to the omission of proposals
presented by the American Jewish Congress if the issuers could
establish that their business with Arab countries and Israel consti-
tuted less than one percent of the company's sales, assets and earn-
ings. 141 When this no-action position was considered for codifica-
tion in 1976, many commentators assailed the "one percent" test
as being an overly-narrow interpretation of an otherwise flexible
provision of paragraph (c)(5). A corporation with a large sales vol-
ume, it was argued, could preclude its shareholders from raising
questions which, although less than one percent of its sales, had a
significant impact on the corporation. 42 Other critics suggested
that there were many instances in which the subject matter of the
proposal was significant to an issuer's business, even though such
significance was not apparent from an economic viewpoint.
1 43
139. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(cX5) (1984). The origin of this provision can be traced to
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-4775 (Dec. 11, 1952) [17 C.F.R. 11,431] wherein
Rule 14a-8 was amended to provide that a security holder proposal may be omitted from
an issuer's proxy material if it was submitted "primarily for the purpose of promoting gen-
eral economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes."
140. The Commission has acknowledged, however, that this provision was only consid-
ered in a limited number of cases from 1973 through 1976. Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-19135, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420 (1982).
141. See, e.g., Division Letter to Libby-Owens-Ford Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEac. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,437 (Feb. 3, 1976).





Seven years after this controversial interpretation, the Com-
mission decided once again to resurrect the "economic signifi-
cance" standard despite its utter failure in 1976. The new rules
re-inject paragraph (c)(5) with a five percent test.144 Thus, the ex-
clusion can now be invoked if a proposal relates to operations ac-
counting for less than 5% of the issuer's total assets and less than
5% of its net earnings and gross sales, (with both figures calcu-
lated to the most recent fiscal year) and the proposal is not other-
wise "significantly related" to the issuer's business.1 45 The reten-
tion of the "significantly related" language provides a loophole
for any proposal that can demonstrate its significant relation to
the issuer's business but cannot fulfill the five percent require-
ment. As the Commission explained:
[T]he proponent [can] provide information that indicates that, while a par-
ticular corporate policy ... involves an arguably insignficant portion of the
issuer's.business, the policy may have a significant impact on other segments
of the issuer's business or subject the issuer to significant contingent
liabilities.
146
The futility of this provision is manifest. By retaining the
"significantly related" test as a loophole to the objective five per-
cent test, the SEC has enabled a proponent to rely on the former
subjective interpretations of paragraph (c)(5). The loophole thus
makes the entire revision of the paragraph meaningless-those
proposal subjects which could establish a sufficient nexus to the is-
suer's business prior to 1984 should remain eligible for inclusion
under the new rule. The Commission's vacillation on this issue
merely confirms, moreover, the argument advanced by commen-
tators in 1976-that it is inherently difficult to inject objective
standards into a basically subjective administrative decision.
3. Rule 14a-8(cX12): Resubmission of proposals. Prior to the re-
cent rule amendments, paragraph (c)(12) provided that a proposal
submitted by a security holder could be omitted from an issuer's
proxy soliciting materials for three years following the inclusion in
the issuer's proxy material of a proposal that was "substantially
the same" and that failed to receive a specified minimum
144. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-20091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218 (1983).
145. Id.
146. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19135, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420 (1982).
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precentage of the votes cast in regard thereto.147 Under this pro-
vision, a shareholder was allowed to resubmit a defeated proposal
to the same company only if the proposal received at least 3% of
the vote the first year, 6% the second, and 10% every year there-
after.1 48 The purpose of paragraph (c)(12) was to relieve issuers
from bearing the cost of including proposals that had generated
little interest when previously presented to the security holders.1 49
Most of the controversy surrounding the rule centered on the in-
terpretation of the phrase "substantially the same proposal." The
staff frequently interpreted this expression to mean "one which is
virtually identical to" a previous proposal, drawing criticism from
several issuers who claimed that the interpretation allowed propo-
nents to evade the spirit of the provision by simply revising a pre-
vious proposal into a slightly different form.1 50
The controversy resurfaced in 1976, when the SEC proposed
to change the test for excluding a proposal under the provision
from "substantially the same" to "substantially the same subject
matter." ' The proposal was never adopted, however, due to the
negative comments received by the staff during the note and com-
ment period.15 2 According to the 1976 Release, the commentators
expressed the following reservations with the "substantially the
same subject matter" language: (1) the abuses of the existing pro-
vision have been rare and do not justify the type of radical revi-
sion proposed; (2) the new standard would be almost impossible to
administer because of the subjective determinations that would be
required under it; and (3) that it would unduly constrain share-
holder suffrage because of its possible "umbrella effect" (i.e. it
could be used to omit proposals that had only a vague relation to
the subject matter of a prior proposal that received little share-
holder support).15
The 1984 revisions of paragraph (c)(12) have reincorporated
the "substantially the same subject matter" language into the pro-
vision despite the unanimous opposition to this proposed change
147. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(12) (1984).
148. Id.
149. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19135, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420 (1982).
150. Id. at 47,429.





in 1976. In the Proposing Release, the Commission admitted that
it would ignore the earlier criticisms expressed on this regulatory
approach. The staff noted:
The revision being considered is identical to the one proposed by the Com-
mission in 1976 and would provide for the omission of a proposal if it "deals
with substantially the same subject matter as a proposal previously submitted
to security holders . . ." While the Commission is well aware of the argu-
ments advanced in opposition to the proposal in 1976, it is concerned about
the increase in the abuse of the existing provision.'"
For the reasons discussed earlier, the premise upon which the
SEC has chosen to rely in advancing the new changes in para-
graph (c)(12) is completely without factual foundation.155 The staff
has yet to produce any statistical data to support its fears regard-
ing the abuse of Rule 14a-8. In fact, it is evident from what little
data that does exist, that the rule is not being abused at this time.
Nevertheless, the agency has chosen to ignore these statistical con-
clusions and proceed with new rule revisions which are manifestly
unnecessary and unworkable.
In addition to adopting the new language of paragraph
(c)(12), the Commission has also raised the percentage require-
ments for the resubmission of proposals. The 3% vote needed the
first year a proposal is placed in a proxy statement has been raised
to 5%, and the 6% vote that must be garnered the following year
has been increased to 8%.151 The 10% threshold requirement af-
ter two years will remain the same. 157 The higher resubmission
percentages are premised on the Commission's belief that share-
holder proposals have generated little interest from shareholders
in the past. Although this statement may have been factually accu-
rate in the early 1970's, recent data suggests that shareholder sup-
port for public policy resolutions has precipitously risen in the
past decade. Whereas in 1973 only 17.5% of the social resolutions
opposed by management received more than a 3% vote, 81 of 111
resolutions (72.9%) received more than the 3% needed for resub-
mission in 1983.158 The Commission's justification for the higher
154. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19135, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420, 47,430
(1982).
155. See supra notes 116-32 and accompanying text.
156. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-20091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218 (1983).
157. Id.
158. See IRRC Report, supra note 7, at 3.
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resubmission percentages, therefore, is fundamentally inconsis-
tent. The staff claim that the proposal process has been abused, by
proponents who submit resolutions which lack shareholder sup-
port, is contrary to the statistical evidence on this issue. This sug-
gests, that the SEC is trying to discourage the use of the proposal
process in a period when Rule 14a-8 is beginning to gain legiti-
macy as an instrument of corporate democracy.
The most significant defect in the SEC justification for the
higher resubmission percentages, however, is not the inadequacy
of the fact-finding proceedings. By adopting more stringent re-
quirements for paragraph (c)(12), the SEC failed to recognize the
realities which confront the current system of proxy voting. The
cause of the lack of support for public policy resolutions, assuming
that these proposals have been unpopular, is not the apathy of in-
dividual shareholders. To the contrary, the most cumbersome
stumbling block to effective corporate democracy (i.e. the legiti-
macy of public policy resolutions and shareholder communication
in general) can be traced to the role of institutional investors in
the corporate electoral process.
4. The role of institutional investors in corporate democracy. Large
institutional investors, including universities, banks, pension funds
and foundations, vested with the discretionary power to vote the
shares of beneficial owners, have become the major shareholders
of many American corporations. The potential power of these in-
stitutional investors in the governance of major corporations can-
not be underestimated, nor overlooked when considering regula-
tory programs for the securities industry. In 1933, when the first
Federal securities law was adopted, institutions owned less than
8.5% of the outstanding stock listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change.1 By 1979, however, the holdings of institutional inves-
tors climbed to approximately 35% of the value of all stock out-
standing. 60 With the continued growth of private and public
pension plans, it is predicted that at least fifty percent of the eq-
uity capital of American corporations may be held by pension
funds by 1985.161 These figures suggest that large institutional in-
159. Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Report on Corporate Accountability,
[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) % 82,674, at 83,712 & n.10, (Sept. 4, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as S.E.C. Report on Corporate Accountability].
160. Id.atn.11.
161. See Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 3, at 683 (citing P. DRucaRn, THE UNSEEN
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vestors possess the potential to exercise tremendous power in the
corporate electoral system and that their involvement in the proxy
system could have a profound impact on corporate behavior.
There is considerable disagreement over whether the power
of institutional investors has been translated into support for pub-
lic policy shareholder resolutions. Some commentators have ar-
gued that the investment managers of these large institutions
rarely vote their beneficiaries' stock in support of social responsi-
bility initiatives.162 Others, notably the SEC, have contended that
institutions are no longer voting in accordance with the "Wall
Street Rule" (i.e. the practice of selling the securities of a com-
pany rather than expressing displeasure by voting against manage-
ment) and have begun to seriously assess shareholder resolu-
tions.163 Presumably, the validity of the new resubmission
requirements is contingent upon one's view of institutional inves-
tors as active shareholders. The former position leads to the con-
clusion that resubmission percentages are unreliable indicators of
proposal popularity because a majority of the voting shares are
either cast unwittingly by large institutions or never cast at all.
The SEC position, on the other hand, suggests that the new mini-
mum percentage requirements can legitimately weed out propos-
als which have been determined by a majority of the voting shares
to be meritless or unworthy of reconsideration.
Although the Commission's assessment of the institutional in-
vestor's role as a shareholder participant may be accurate, the
SEC regulatory response to this conclusion is unfounded. The
problem with the participation of institutions in the corporate
proxy system is not whether those institutions decide to vote in
favor of social responsibility issues. The problem is more accu-
rately defined as whether the institutional voting practices and
procedures are legitimate in the sense that the views of the benefi-
cial owners have been adequately represented by institutional
REVOLUTION 15-16 (1976)).
162. Id. at 686-87.
163. S.E.C. Report on Corporate Accountability, supra note 159, at 83,712. Accord-
ing to a newsletter published by the Council on Economic Priorities, some institutional
investors have even begun to sponsor their own social resolutions. For example, the Cali-
fornia State Teachers Retirement System, with more than $7 billion in assets, has co-spon-
sored a resolution asking Standard Oil of Indiana to disclose certain employment-related
data. the fund's action may signal an end to the reluctance of major investors to play an
active role in the shareholder process. Minding the Corporate Conscience, supra note 137.
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choice. The appropriate regulatory response to this problem is
not the imposition of higher resubmission percentages but rather
a coherent set of administrative rules aimed at reducing the dis-
cretionary voting power of investment managers, trustees, etc.
These rules should encourage institutional investors to adopt one
or more of the following options: (1) the establishment of formal-
ized procedures for processing proxy statements and reaching vot-
ing decisions;1" (2) the disclosure of their proxy voting practices
to both their own shareholders and to the beneficial owners of the
shares they manage;'15 (3) the offering to beneficial owners of the
opportunity to influence institutional decisions on proxy issues
(e.g., establish internal social responsibility committees);16 and (4)
the "pass through" of voting rights to the beneficial owners of the
shares.1 67
Perhaps to its credit, the SEC in 1978 proposed similar al-
though more limited disclosure rules to regulate the voting prac-
tices of institutional investors.0 s The proposed rule, Rule
14a-3(b)(1 1), would have required certain institutions and parent
holding companies subject to the proxy rules to disclose their vot-
ing policies and procedures in their annual reports to sharehold-
ers. The major drawback with the amendment was that many
large institutions, such as banks and insurance companies acting as
trustees, were not covered by the proposed disclosure require-
ments since their securities were not registered pursuant to sec-
tion 12 of the Exchange Act.169 Although the proposed rule
amendment was never adopted, the rulemaking proceedings nev-
ertheless displayed the Commission's concern with the voting
practices of institutional investors. Given the tremendous influ-
ence of institutional investors on the corporate proxy system and
the SEC recognition of shareholder interest in institutional voting
policies and procedures, the latest revision of paragraph (c)(12)
should be regarded as an inadequate regulatory response to the
exigencies of the securities industry. The SEC committment to
corporate democracy and shareholder communication would have
164. S.E.C Report on Corporate Accountability, supra note 159, at 83,712.
165. Id.
166. See Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 3, at 691.
167. Id.
168. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-14970, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,945 (1978).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(C), (G) (1982).
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been better served if the staff had made a greater effort to bring
the majority of institutional investors within the realm of a disclos-
ure rule.
17 0
In sum, the three rule revisions discussed above suggest that
the Commission has created more regulatory burdens than it has
alleviated. To a certain extent, this problem was created by the
factual inadequacies of the Commission's rulemaking proceedings.
Many of the staff's theories of the abuse of the proposal process
were simply untrue. To a larger extent, however, the real regula-
tory nightmares of the 1984 amendments can be traced to the
Commission's misplaced confidence in its ability to make objective
administrative decisions. Perhaps the Commission would have
done better if it had listened to the admonition of one of its own
members. Commissioner Bevis Longstreth, who has frequently
criticized the ability of the SEC to perfect the regulatory frame-
work of Rule 14a-8 through continuous modifications, once
observed:
[Administering Rule 14a-8] has entangled the staff in a parade of issues turn-
ing on state law, corporate policy, social engineering and political questions
to which we, as regulators, can contribute little .... [G]reater precision
and more complex involvement by the Commission in the process does not
necessarily result in more perfect regulation-just more regulation, together
with greater cost and even more uncertainty for the private sector."1
The Commissioner's observations highlight the practical limita-
tions of the new rules.
CONCLUSION
When the Commission first initiated the rulemaking proceed-
ing for the Rule 14a-8 revisions, it noted that the process was "a
reevaluation of the need for and desirability of providing a right
of security holder access to the issuer's proxy statement . . . and
if such right of access is to be continued, what the nature of such
170. After noting that the regulation of institutional investors pursuant to section 14
of the Exchange Act could transcend the existing authority of the Commission, the SEC
pointed out that the staff would nevertheless be authorized to develop a legislative proposal
to amend section 13(o of the Exchange Act so as to require disclosure by institutions of the
proxy voting practices and procedures. S.E.C. Report on Corporate Accountability, supra
note 159, at 83,713.
171. B. Longstreth, "The SEC and Shareholder Proposals: Simplification in Regula-
tion," Remarks to Nat'l Assn. of Manufacturers, Denver, Colorado (Dec. 11, 1981), quoted
in Propp, supra note 3, at 101 n.6.
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right should be.' 72 The Commission's rhetorical query was an
understatement. Since its inception, Rule 14a-8 has touched the
heart of state corporation law-affecting the fundamental rela-
tionship of shareholders and management to each other and to
the corporation.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Commission's recent
attempt to reform the regulatory framework of the Rule has been
both applauded and denounced within the same breath. Those
supporting the management interest maintain that the new rule is
a well-conceived and balanced effort by the SEC to preserve an
inexpensive, non-confrontational solicitation process. Critics of
the new rule contend that the Commission has arbitrarily sus-
pended the shareholders' interest in maintaining an effective voice
in the governance of modern corporations. Both sides would be
willing to agree that any modification of the rule is inextricably
forced to benefit one side of this delicate balance at the expense
of the other.
In 1980, SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams summed up the
delicate nature of this balancing process and the importance of
the SEC's sensitivity to the interests represented on either side.
He stated:
Americans have a deep rooted sense that power, no matter how beneficient
its exercise, must be accountable to society at large, and we have witnessed
in the past decade notable and well publicized instances in which corporate
power has been abused to the detriment of the public. As a result, calls for
legislative constraints on the corporate decision-making process have a deep
appeal. It is this dilemma, the undeniable economic success of the corpora-
tion and the role which flexibility and governance mechanisms has played in
that success on the one side, and, on the other, the growing sense that this
flexibility ought to be restrained, which makes discussion of corporate ac-
countability both challenging and difficult for those who are genuinely sensi-
tive to both the importance of the national economic health and the signifi-
cance of public confidence in the legitimacy of corporate power.
17
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Commission's latest
revision of Rule 14a-8 was the staff's demonstrated ambivalence
for preserving the historic legitimacy of the rule. The Commission
chose to adopt several restrictive provisions, all designed to limit
172. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19135, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420, 47,421
(1982).
173. Speech by Harold M. Williams to the Nat'l Conference on Corporate Govern-
ance in the 1980s, reprinted in A.L.I.-A.B.A. COMM. ON CoNT. PRor. EDUC. 10 (1981).
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shareholder access to the proposal process, despite the lack of doc-
umentary support for the changes. In so doing, the SEC repudi-
ated a congressional mandate and a judicial recognition of corpo-
rate democracy, and, above all, a public sentiment which seeks
greater accountability of the powerful economic institutions which
affect our society.
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